The multi-leader-follower game can be looked on as a generalization of the Nash equilibrium problem and the Stackelberg game, which contains several leaders and a number of followers. Recently, the multi-leader-follower game has been drawing more and more attention, for example, in electricity power markets. However, when we formulate a general multi-leader-follower game as a single-level game, it will give rise to a lot of problems, such as the lack of convexity and the failure of constraint qualifications. In this paper, to get rid of these difficulties, we focus on a class of multi-leader-follower games that satisfy some particular, but still reasonable assumptions, and show that these games can be formulated as ordinary Nash equilibrium problems, and then as variational inequalities. We establish some results on the existence and uniqueness of a leader-follower Nash equilibrium. We also present illustrative numerical examples from an electricity power market model. keywords: Multi-leader-follower game · Nash equilibrium problem · variational inequality · deregulated electricity market model
role in many application areas of economics, engineering and science; see [3, 4] .
The Stackelberg game, also called the single-leader-follower game, arises from the oligopolistic competition. In a Stackelberg game, there is a distinctive player, called the leader, who optimizes the upper-level problem and a number of remaining players, called the followers, who optimize the lower-level problems jointly. In particular, the leader can anticipate the response of the followers, and then use this ability to select his optimal strategy. At the same time, each follower selects her optimal strategy according to the strategies of the leader and the followers.
When dealing with more complex practical problems, such as a deregulated electricity market, we have to consider the competition among several firms and a different type of agents.
The corresponding problem is called the multi-leader-follower game, which has several leaders and followers. Each leader can also anticipate the response of the followers, and uses this ability to select his strategy to compete with the other leaders. At the same time, each follower selects his optimal strategy according to the strategies of all leaders as well as the other followers. We are particularly interested in the situation, where no player can improve his status by changing his strategy unilaterally, which we call a leader-follower Nash equilibrium, or simply a L/F Nash equilibrium.
The multi-leader-follower game has recently been studied by some researchers and used to model several problems in applications. Pang and Fukushima [5] introduced a class of remedial models for the multi-leader-follower game, that can be formulated as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) with convexified strategy sets; they also proposed some oligopolistic competition models in electricity power markets, that led to multi-leader-follower games.
Based on the strong stationarity conditions of each leader in a multi-leader-follower game, Leyffer and Munson [6] derived a family of nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP), nonlinear programming problem, and mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) formulations of the multi-leader-follower game. They also reformulated the game as a square nonlinear complementarity problem by imposing an additional restriction. Outrata [7] converted a kind of multi-leader-follower games to the equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints (EPECs) and presented some Karush-Kuhn-Tucher (KKT) type of necessary conditions for equilibria. Sherali [8] considered a special multi-leader-follower game where each leader anticipates the response explicitly by the aggregate follower reaction curve. He also showed the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the game called generalized-StackelbergNash Cournot equilibrium, and then proposed a numerical approach to find a generalizedStackelberg-Nash Cournot equilibrium. Unlike the above deterministic multi-leader-follower games, DeMiguel and Xu [9] considered a stochastic multi-leader-follower game. They intro-duced a new concept called stochastic multiple-leader Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot equilibrium and showed the existence and uniqueness results under some assumptions. They proposed also a numerical approach to seek the Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot equilibrium with a sample average approximation method. Even with these efforts, we still have to face a lot of problems when we deal with the multi-leader-follower game, because of the inherent difficulties such as the lack of convexity and the failure of constraint qualifications.
In this paper, we consider a simplified multi-leader-follower game with one follower, which still has wide applications; see [5, 10, 11] . Under some particular assumptions on the cost functions of both leaders and follower, as well as the constraints in the follower's problem, we show that the game can be reduced to a NEP, which may further be reformulated as a variational inequality (VI). Moreover, under suitable assumptions, we establish the existence and uniqueness of a L/F Nash equilibrium. We also consider an optimization reformulation of the VI and give some conditions that guarantee a stationarity point of the optimization problem to be a L/F Nash equilibrium. Finally, we present illustrative numerical examples of an electricity power market that consists of two or three firms as the leaders and the independent system operator (ISO) as the follower.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we collect some basic definitions and present some preliminary results that will be used later. In Section 3, we introduce the particular multi-leader-follower game considered in the paper, and formulate it as a NEP.
In Section 4, we reformulate it as a VI and show some conditions that ensure the existence and uniqueness of a L/F Nash equilibrium. In Sections 5 and 6, we give an application in an electricity power market, and show some illustrative numerical examples from this model. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude the paper.
Preliminaries
We start this section with some notations. A function G : R 
, where T denotes transposition.
Multi-Leader-Follower Games with One Follower
In this subsection, we describe a multi-leader-follower game with one follower and define the corresponding L/F Nash equilibrium. First, we introduce the NEP and the Nash equilibrium.
In a NEP, there are N players labelled by integers ν = 1, · · · , N . Player ν's strategy is denoted by the vector x ν ∈ R nν and his cost function θ ν (x) depends on the strategies of all players, which are collectively denoted by the vector x ∈ R n consisting of the subvectors
is independent of the strategies of the other players, which are denoted collectively by x
, which consists of all players' strategies except player ν, player ν solves the following optimization problem with his own variable
where we denote
) to emphasize the role of x ν in this problem. A strategy
A typical multi-leader-follower game with N leaders and one follower can be described as Let γ(x, y) and K(x) denote, respectively, the follower's objective function and strategy set, which depend on the leaders' strategy tuple x. For each given strategy tuple x of the leaders, the follower chooses his strategy by solving the following optimization problem with variable y:
We denote the set of optimal solutions to this problem by Y (x). Now, we define the concept of Nash equilibrium for the above multi-leader-follower game with N leaders and one follower. 
Here, for each ) optimistically. This definition for the multi-leader-follower game extends that of an optimistic Stackelberg game considerd by Lignola and Morgan [12] . Note that the follower will actually choose his optimal strategy y * ∈ Y (x * ) responding to all leaders' strategies x * , which may be different from the optimistic anticipations y ν by the leaders. However, such complication is completely avoided, when the follower's optimal response Y (x) is a singleton for any x, which is the case for the game we consider in Section 3 of this paper.
Variational Inequality
The variational inequality VI(S, F ) is to find a vector x * ∈ S such that
where S ⊆ R n is a nonempty, closed and convex set and
Here we assume the function F to be continuously differentiable. Applications of a variational inequality can be found in various areas, such as transportation systems, mechanics, and economics; see [13, 14] .
Suppose that the feasible set S can be represented as , satisfies the following KKT conditions:
Conversely, if a triple (x, µ, λ) ∈ R n+p+m satisfies (2), then x solves VI(S, F ). We call a triple (x, µ, λ) ∈ R n+p+m a KKT triple iff it satisfies the above KKT conditions. Moreover, the corresponding x-vector is called a KKT point. For simplicity, when there is no possibility of confusion, we shall often refer to a KKT triple simply as a KKT point.
The following definition will be useful in this paper.
(c) strongly monotone on X with modulus α > 0 iff
Clearly, strong monotonicity implies strict monotonicity, and strict monotonicity implies monotonicity. The following proposition shows the well known relations between these monotonicity properties of F and the positive semidefiniteness or positive definiteness of the Jacobian matrix ∇F (x) [15] . As to the existence and uniqueness of a solution in the variational inequality, a number of results are known. One of the most fundamental results relies on the compactness of the set X.
Other existence results can be obtained by imposing another condition, such as coerciveness of the function F , instead of the compactness of X. On the other hand, under some monotonicity assumptions on F , the following two results on the uniqueness of a solution can be presented [16] . 
VI(S, F ).
The following proposition shows a basic relation between the NEP and the VI [17] . , then a strategy tuple
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if x solves the VI(X, F ), where
3 Multi-Leader-Follower Games with Special Structure
In this section, we concentrate on a multi-leader-follower game with the following special structure:
Follower's Problem.
Here, all functions are assumed to be C Then the above multi-leader-follower game can be written as follows:
In this game, the objective functions of N leaders and the follower contain some related terms. Specifically, the second term of the objective function appears in the follower's objective function in the negated form. Therefore, the game partly contains a kind of zero-sum structure between each leader and the follower. An application of such special multi-leader-follower games will be presented with some illustrative numerical examples later.
In the remainder of the paper, for simplicity, we will mainly consider the following game with two leaders, labelled I and II. The results presented below can be extended to the case of more than two leaders in a straightforward manner.
Leader I's Problem.
Leader II's Problem.
Since the follower's problem is a strictly convex quadratic programming problem with equality constraints, it is equivalent to finding a pair (y, λ) ∈ R m×p satisfying the following KKT system of linear equations:
Note that, under the given assumptions, a KKT pair (y, λ) exists uniquely for each (x 
) for y in the leaders' problems, the leaders' objective functions can be rewritten as
where G ∈ R m×n I , H ∈ R m×n II , and r ∈ R m are given by
Let the functions defined by (4) and (5) be denoted as Θ I : R n I +n II → R and Θ II : R n I +n II → R, respectively. Then we can formulate the above multi-leader-follower game as the following NEP, which we call the NEP(
Remark 3.1. Instead of solving the KKT system (3) explicitly, we may leave it as additional constraints in each leader's problem. This results in a GNEP, which has attracted much attention recently [5, 18] .
Existence and Uniqueness of L/F Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we further reformulate the NEP(Θ ν , X ν ) II ν=I derived in the previous section as a variational inequality, and discuss the existence and uniqueness of a L/F Nash equilibrium.
Throughout this section, we assume the sets X 
where matrix P ∈ R m×m is given by
Since P is a projection matrix, it is symmetric, idempotent, and positive semidefinite. 
, ν = I, II and the function
Here we notice that matrices D I G and D II H are symmetric from the definitions of G and H, respectively.
The VI Lagrangian function is written as
the VI Lagrangian function with respect to x is written as
, which is symmetric and positive semidefinite. Then we can write 
Consider the following products of matrices: 
Since the matrices
is also positive semidefinite.
Theorem 4.1. If the function
is strictly monotone, and the NEP(Θ ν , X ν ) II ν=I has at least one solution, then the solution is unique.
Proof. By Lemma 4.1, the matrix  
The Multi-Leader-Follower Game in Deregulated Electricity Market
Privatization and restructuring of the edregulated electricity markets have taken place in many countries, although an excessive free market also has a possibility to bring about some trouble. Under this situation, a lot of researchers have paid much attention to the noncooperative competition problems in this area, see [5, 10, 19] . In this section, we present a simple model of competitive bidding under some macroeconomic regulation. We will show that it can be formulated as the multi-leader-follower game that we have considered in the previous sections.
In this model, there are several firms and one market maker, called the ISO, who employs a market cleaning mechanism to collect the electricity from firms by paying the bid costs, determine the price of electricity and sell it to consumers. We omit the problem of consumers, which means any quantity of electricity power can be consumed. The structure of the model can be described as follows. Again, for simplicity, we assume there are only two firms I and II. The two firms are competing for market power in an electricity network with M nodes. We assume that firms I and II produce the electricity with fixed quantities a 
where ξ ν i , i = 1, · · · , M , are positive empirical upper bounds set by the firm ν, ν = I, II. We further assume that the firms' bid functions are given by
are bid matrices of firm ν, which are defined by D I = (−I, 0) and
, where I is the identity matrix and 0 is the zero matrix. We will write the constraints of the above problem as Moreover, we assume that some economic interventionism works in this electricity model in order to maintain some equilibrium between the quantities of electricity at each node from two firms, which is represented by some quadratic terms denoted by
where a ν , ν = I, II, are the quantities of electricity produced by firm I, II, respectively, and each economic interventionism parameter ε i is positive and small. We assume a ν , ν = I, II, are fixed. Under the economic interventionism, the ISO tries to let each firm ν supply the electricity in such a way that the quantity tends to be proportional to his total amount a ν at each node. At the same time, the ISO employs a market mechanism to determine a set of nodal prices and electricity quantities from each firm at each node in order to maximize its profit (the revenue minus the bid costs), or minimize the negative profit. We further assume that, at each node, the affine demand curves determine the prices p i as a function of the total quantity of electricity from firms I and II as follows. 
Note that the first two terms of the ISO's objective function is rewritten as
Notice that matrix B is positive definite. Moreover, the constraints of the ISO can be rewritten
where
Therefore, the electricity market model under consideration can be formulated as the following multi-leader-follower game:
Firm (Leader) I's Problem.
In light of the analysis in the previous sections, we can further reformulate the multi-leaderfollower game as the following VI: Find a vector ρ * = (ρ * ,I
, ρ * ,II
Remark 5.2. The assumption that the follower's problem does not contain inequality constraints would narrow down the range of applications of the model. In fact, the approach presented in this paper cannot be extended directly to the inequality constrained case. Nevertheless we may still try to make some further efforts to deal with inequality constraints based on the current approach. Suppose that the follower solves the optimization problem
A possible idea to deal with the inequality constraint q ≥ 0 is the following: First, we just ignore it, apply the above-mentioned VI formulation, and find a L/F Nash equilibrium. Next, we check the components of q in the equilibrium. If they are all nonnegative, then we accept the current equilibrium as a solution of the problem. Otherwise, we set the negative components of q to be 0, or in other words, we discard those components. Then we try to find a L/F Nash equilibrium of the reduced problem by ignoring the inequality constraint q ≥ 0 again. Repeating this heuristic procedure, we will eventually obtain an approximate L/F Nash equilibrium of the original game.
Numerical Experiments
In this section, we show numerical results for the electricity market model described in the previous section.
Note that X in (8) can be represented as
Thus the VI is a box-constrained variational inequality (BVI), denoted by BVI(X, F (ρ)). .
First we solve a model with two firms I, II, who dispatch the electricity to two nodes i = 1, 2.
We set the problem data as follows:
We also set the problem data ε = (ε 1 , ε 2 ) as listed in Table 1 We may observe from the table that the economic interventionism terms play an important role in the distribution of electricity quantities at each node. As the economic interventionism parameters ε i , i = 1, 2, become larger, the ratio of electricity quantities supplied by firm I and firm II gets closer to the ratio of the amount of electricity a Also in this procedure, both firms' optimal profits are nondecreasing, but the ISO's profit is decreasing.
We also solved a larger electricity market model with three firms and five nodes, where the following problem data are used: We also set ε = (ε 1 , ε 2 , ε 3 , ε 4 , ε 5 ) as listed in Table 2 
Conclusions
Considering the difficulties of general multi-leader-follower games, this paper has focused on a multi-leader-follower game with some particular structure, which contains one follower whose optimization problem is a strictly convex quadratic program with equality constraints.
Then the multi-leader-follower game is formulated as a NEP, which can further be formulated as a VI. We have shown the existence and uniqueness of a L/F Nash equilibrium. We have also presented an application in electricity power markets with some numerical results.
